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THIS SYMPOSIUM United States v. Durham is hailed for its re-
definition of the limits of criminal responsibility in mental illness.
Almost a century ago a similar redefinition was adopted in New
Hampshire,' but until 1954 no American court or legislature had fol-
lowed this lead. Under the traditional M'Naghten2 test, which was re-
jected in these decisions, evidence of mental illness may be considered
only if it establishes that the accused was unable to understand the
moral quality of his act. Psychiatrists have long complained that this
test apparently excludes those serious mental illnesses which make it
impossible for the individual to control certain impulses although he
recognizes his actions as "wrong." The same criticism has been made
again and again by legal writers. In some states (and the District of
Columbia) the M'Naghten test has been supplemented by an "irre-
sistible impulse" rule, but many judges have refused to take this step
and even where the rule has been recognized it has been rather narrow-
ly applied.
Why is it that courts and legislatures have been so tardy in chang-
ing the M'Naghten rule? One source of hesitancy has been the tension
between the traditions of law and psychiatry in relation to free will.
It is important to explore possibilities for relieving this tension if the
Durham rule is to have wide adoption and if it is to be successfully
administered.
In the Durham opinion, the connection between free will and re-
sponsibility is explicit.3 For Judge Bazelon, the issue is as follows: Did
the defendant's act stem from mental disease or defect, or was it the
result of an exercise of free will? If the latter, moral blame attaches,
and criminal responsibility is therefore imposed; if the former, crimi-
nal responsibility should not be imposed because moral blame does not
attach.
t James Parker Hall Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
I State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1869) ; State v. Jones, g0 N.H. 369 (1871).
'M'Naghten's Case, 10 CI. & Fin. 200 (H.L., 1843).
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Many psychiatrists have insisted upon abandonment of the concept
of responsibility based upon free will and moral blameworthiness. This
is the central theme of The Criminal, the Judge, and the Public, by
Dr. Franz Alexander, then of the Psychoanalytic Institute of Berlin,
and Hugo Staub, a practicing attorney. In their chapter on responsi-
bility, the authors "make bold and enter the Augean stables of philos-
ophy of law... ." They dismiss the concept of free will as "an expres-
sion of the narcissistic wish, or even the postulate of the moralists that
the Super-Ego does, or should rule, supreme and unlimited in the psy-
chic apparatus of men. .. 2" On the contrary, "[p]sychoanalysis con-
siders the human psychic apparatus as a system which is fully, and
without a single gap, determined by psychological and biological causa-
tive factors."4
It is this theory of human behavior which is viewed with alarm by
many lawyers. Thus an American Bar Association committee warned
in 1945 that the spread of psychoanalytic doctrines "calls for careful
consideration" because these doctrines "tend toward determinism."5
The committee hinted darkly that adherence to these views may dis-
qualify psychiatrists as expert witnesses on mental capacity and re-
sponsibility.
Lawyers and psychiatrists are thus prone to sterile deadlock on the
question of moral fault and the retributive function of the criminal law.
Such a deadlock is highly unfortunate; it not only obscures the great
area common to the two traditions, but also breeds a defensiveness in
which extension of common ground is impossible. In this comment I
shall try to illustrate the kind of agreement which is possible among
lawyers and psychiatrists who are loyal to their respective traditions
and yet mindful of the limits of their respective disciplines.
Laying aside the question of the reality of free wili, lawyers and
psychiatrists can agree that the great majority of people should be
treated as if they had free will. Indeed, careful judges often speak of
legal responsibility as based upon an assumption of free will. Thus Mr.
Justice Cardozo spoke of the law as "guided by a robust common sense
which assumes the freedom of the will as a working hypothesis in the
solution of its problems." 6 Mr. Justice Jackson has said:
'Alexander and Staub, The Criminal, the judge, and the Public 70, 71 (1931). See also
Freud, General Introduction to Psychoanalysis 45, 95 (Riviere trans., 1943).
" 70 A.B.A. Rep. 338, 339 (1945).
'Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937).
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How far one by an exercise of free will may determine his general destiny or his
course in a particular matter and how far he is the toy of circumstance has been
debated through the ages by theologians, philosophers, and scientists. Whatever
doubts they have entertained as to the matter, the prictical business of govern-
ment and administration of the law is obliged to proceed on more or less rough
and ready judgments based on the assumption that mature and rational persons
are in control of their own conduct.7
Similarly, Dr. Alexander has written:
[W]e may for practical purposes hold the individual responsible for his acts; that
is to say, we assume an attitude as if the conscious Ego actually possessed the
power to do what it wishes. Such an attitude has no theoretical foundation, but
it has a practical, or still better, a tactical justification.8
Furthermore, lawyers and psychiatrists are largely in agreement as
to reasons for treating most people in this manner. Whatever the skep-
ticism as to the deterrent effect of punishment upon actual offenders,
it is agreed that criminal responsibility must be imposed for its gen-
eral deterrent effect. Psychoanalysts, in particular, insist that "nor-
mal," peaceful citizens need, in the management of their instinctual
drives, the support of the law and its threat of punishment. Nor do
either lawyers or psychiatrists exclude the possibility that imposition
of responsibility may have a teaching or reformatory effect, however
difficult it may be to accomplish this end and however inadequate may
be the efforts actually made.
It is agreed, therefore, that most people should be treated as if their
actions proceeded from free choice. But it is also agreed that such
treatment is inappropriate for some individuals. How is this minority
to be identified? This is the problem of the Durham case. Psychiatrists
may object to Judge Bazelon's test-the presence or absence of free
will, but the objection may be largely verbal. Dr. Alexander, for exam-
ple, urges that a scientific concept of responsibility would be based
upon "the degree and mode of participation of the Ego in a given act."9
Similarly, according to the recent report of the Committee on Psychia-
try and Law of the Group for Advancement of Psychiatry:
[E]go impairment would appear to be a direct measure of responsibility. Ego im-
pairment implies lessened control in maintaining behavioral norms of social inter-
action. In law, such would be the basis of exculpation .... On this level of abstrac-
' Gregg Cartage & Storage Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 74, 79-80 (1941).
8Alexander and Staub, op. cit. supra note 4, at 72-73.
Ibid., at 74.
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tion the lawyer and psychiatrist can agree. The psychiatrist can determine that ego
impairment exists and the lawyer can transpose the fact into his terms of intent
and responsibility."0
The committee proposed a statute providing for acquittal (and hospital
commitment) if the act was a consequence of illness which so lessened
the accused's capacity to use "his judgment, discretion and control in
the conduct of his affairs and social relations as to warrant his com-
mitment to a mental institution.""
As the lawyer reflects on this psychological concept of responsibility,
he notes that here responsibility is a term referring to an individual's
capacity for "judgment, discretion and control" in the conduct of his
affairs. The psychiatrist tells him, furthermore, that most (if not all)
human beings have a capacity to grow in responsibility; that in healthy
individuals such growth can come in response to life experience and
that in the mentally ill it normally comes only in response to therapy.
Here the lawyer may raise a question. In a given situation is the
possibility of growth in responsibility fully determined by the existing
character of the individual and the relative strength of the various ex-
ternal factors? Or is there a residual element of choice or personal
response? Faced with this question, not all psychiatrists are dogmatic
in their determinism. The following quotation is from Dr. Stanley A.
Leavy of the Yale School of Medicine:
Insofar as we approach the subject inductively we can come out with nothing
but a deterministic view; causality is even seen to reign within the moral life as it
does elsewhere .... [But] only a prejudice would make us deny the reality of ali
our choices. A scientific statement of the matter at this point seems to me this:
that we really have moral choices, and that when we examine them, we find their
determinants, and these two clauses are not reducible to one another, i.e., the dis-
covery of causality in human experience does not exhaust its meaning.12
In psychotherapy this question of choice may be put as follows: If
therapy is to be successful, must the patient exert effort and, if so, is
the exertion of effort fully explained by tracing its appearance to exist-
ing character traits and to the new determinants brought to bear by
the therapist? This question was raised in an address on Determinism,
"Freedom," and Psychotherapy,3 by Dr. Robert P. Knight as presi-
o Group for Advancement of Psychiatry, Criminal Responsibility and Psychiatric Ex-
pert Testimony, Report No. 26, p. 6 n. 21 (1954).
1Ibid., at 8.
'Leavy, Psychological Understanding of Religious Experience 15-16 (1953).
" 9 Psychiatry 251 (1946).
[Vol. 22
INSANITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
dent of the American Psychopathological Association. The address was
a direct and elaborate rejoinder to the bar association warning referred
to above. It expounded a thoroughgoing determinism and yet insisted
upon the necessity for effort. After puzzling over this address, I wrote
to Dr. Knight asking whether there is not a paradox between psycho-
logical determinism and the notion of "effort" which patients (and
everyone else) must make in order to grow in responsibility. (I had
laid a wager with one of my colleagues that Dr. Knight would admit
the existence of paradox.) He replied as follows:
Yes, I puzzled quite a bit over the paradox of psychic determinism vs. "effort,"
and have not yet reconciled it to my satisfaction. One can say that the effort itself
is also determined-which seems to be something of a tour de force-or one can
concede that, especially in psychotherapy, one expects and mobilizes more effort
than the amount which is yet "determined" by previous experience. Such factors
as transference (in therapy), inspirational influences, and conceptions of one's self
or of one's completed work, projected into the future, may be regarded as deter-
mining factors, but I still, at this stage of my thinking at least, feel that there is
something left over. Harry Emerson Fosdick ... calls it a "personal rejoinder" to
life experience. I think you win your bet.
Such concessions by psychiatrists pave the way for self-questioning
on the part of the lawyer. He has been unwilling to admit that free will
is only an expedient assumption; but does he assert the reality of a
freedom coextensive with that which the law assumes? Does he affirm
anything broader than the limited power the existence of which psy-
chiatrists such as Dr. Knight and Dr. Leavy at least do not deny?
This, as I see it, is a power to accept or reject opportunities for growth
in responsibility. Acceptance of such opportunities means acceptance
of external help and of painful self-knowledge; rejection means rejec-
tion of help and refusal to endure the growing pains of advance toward
responsibility.
In such a view the area of free choice is far more limited than the
area assumed by common-sense notions of moral responsibility. In
many situations, the help which is necessary for moral growth is not
present or its presence is not realized. The individual cannot therefore
strictly be said to act with free choice or to be at fault. However, in
common-sense morality and in law, he is treated as if having wider
freedom of choice. Here the lawyer recognizes that in imposing the
wider responsibility "the law" imposes vicarious responsibility, i.e.,
responsibility for consequence of the acts of others who have deter-
mined the individual's character and actions. The lawyer notes, also,
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that it is impossible in actual situations to separate this vicarious re-
sponsibility from the residual responsibility for choices freely made.
Nor does the healthy, mature person make any attempt at such a sepa-
ration; he treats himself as fully responsible.
These reflections are somewhat disturbing. One concern of the law-
yer is with the morality of the criminal law (apart from mental ill-
ness). He is not satisfied to make punishment merely a matter of
social expediency. He is shocked by Holmes's letter to Laski:
If I were having a philosophical talk with a man I was going to have hanged (or
electrocuted) I should say, I don't doubt that your act was inevitable for you but
to make it more avoidable by others we propose to sacrifice you to the common
good. You may regard yourself as a soldier dying for your country if you like. But
the law must keep its promises.14
This is revolting; but would it be any more satisfactory to modify the
"philosophical talk" as follows?
I don't doubt that your act was largely the result of the acts of your parents and
others who determined your character. At the moment of your crime you may have
had no real freedom. But when you first thought of this crime, didn't you have
some freedom to turn in another direction? And at many points in your life have
you not failed to take advantage of opportunities to act constructively when sup-
porting influences were available? We can never know the extent to which an act
is the result of such failures. The law makes no attempt to do so; it treats you
as fully responsible and thus in part makes you suffer vicariously for the acts of
others.
This may not seem, at least at first glance, an attractive resolution
of the problem of retribution, and the lawyer may now be tempted to
abandon the retribution concept. But some psychiatrists warn against
this course. Thus Dr. Robert Waelder has pointed out that everyone,
without exception, believes that retribution in some sense should fol-
low violation of law; he explains that the apparent opponents of retri-
bution merely hold someone other than the criminal guilty of his act-
"society," "the ruling class," etc.' 5 Dr. Waelder has also written:
[T]he complete elimination of the concept of retribution from the legal system
may not be without danger. It would tend to dissociate the law entirely from moral
sentiment. If the law no longer must conform, by and large, to moral standards,
utilitarianism or expediency becomes its only guide. The emancipation from tra-
ditional moral sentiments, begun at first for humanitarian purposes, may eventually
have consequences not so humanitarian. Once everything can be done that appears
to be socially useful, i.e., that is so considered by those who have authority to de-
fine social usefulness, a course has been charted that may well end in despotism.
"'Holmes-Laski Letters 806 (Howe ed., 1953).
'Waelder, Psychiatry and the Problem of Criminal Responsibility, 101 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 378, 386-87 (1952).
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Liberal positivism, in its humanitarian distaste for the harsher aspects of traditional
morality, may, by undermining the authority of traditional morality, become the
path-breaker of more ruthless successors. The humanitarian goal ... seems to me
to be better served by the progressive mitigation of the severity of retribution
rather than by an attempt to eliminate the retributive aspect altogether.' 6
If, despite such warnings, the idea of retribution were to be aban-
doned, the law's concept of responsibility might be stated in terms
which are entirely forward-looking. It might be said that the law sum-
mons all men to responsibility. It expects the relatively healthy, "de-
terrable" individuals to respond with only the help which the common
life affords. It therefore punishes because "the law must keep its
promises." Those unable to respond it segregates by commitment, with
opportunity (more or less) for growth in responsibility in the course
of therapy.
Such a view may satisfy the lawyer if he may posit a duty (as well
as a limited power) to become responsible. Perhaps the poignancy of
the difficulty can be expressed only by the poet. Thus, to quote Robert
Penn Warren:
... For if the thing
Accomplished would seem to accomplish only its own
Inevitability, and the thing that exists
Would seem to fulfill only its own being,...
Yet the accomplished was once the unaccomplished
And the existing was once the non-existing,
And that transition was the agony of will
And anguish of option-or such it seems
To any man who has striven in the hot day and glare of contingency
... And such it seems
To all who would lay a strong hand strongly on life,
And as for the others, let us wish them well
In the ineluctable sterility of their various sanatoria
Where all the light is like a light from snow,
And hope that there's always somebody to change the bedpans.
No, that is wicked. We know we all need grace,
And pity too, and charity is the index
Of strength, but, by God, that's still no reason
To regard all history as a private alibi-factory
And all God's gleaming world as a ward for occupational therapy.
For if responsibility is not
The thing given but the thing to be achieved,
There is still no way out of the responsibility
Of trying to achieve responsibility.
So, like it or lump it, you are stuck.17
' Warren, Brother to Dragons 111-12 (1953).
1955]
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What may continue to trouble the lawyer is the vicarious character
of legal responsibility (and of common-sense moral responsibility) once
the limits of free will are recognized. He has assumed that vicarious
liability is exceptional; now he is asked to recognize that liability for
"fault" is also in large measure vicarious. Perhaps he may get used to
this idea, particularly when he finds that it is not merely a creature of
the dialectic of law and psychiatry. He can find this idea in discussions
of responsibility in the tradition of Christian ethics. Thus, in the words
of Sir Walter Moberly:
[Responsibility is not] simply a liability arising out of a power. It may also be
a power arising out of a voluntary, and apparently quixotic, embracing of a liability
that could have been disputed....
It may be [that it is] by the acceptance of a moral liability greater than appears
to be due that moral advance is made.18
The foregoing pages indicate the possibility of profound understand-
ing between psychiatrists and lawyers; their collaboration need not be
in an atmosphere of hostile armistice. As for United States v. Durham,
it is to be hoped that psychiatrists will not cavil at Judge Bazelon's
use of the concept of free will, recognizing that this refers to an "as if"
conception which they also accept as a practical tool in dealing with
relatively healthy people. It is to be hoped also that lawyers and legis-
lators will consider on its merits the change effected by the decision,
free from the fear that it necessarily weakens the moral force of the
law.
"Moberly, Responsibility 53-54 (1951).
